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  The	  United	  States	  is	  not	  a	  battle0ield,	  and	  our	  homes	  and	  communities	  should	  not	  be	  targets	  for	  military	  raids.	  But	  throughout	  Massachusetts	  today,	  forces	  composed	  of	  members	  of	  our	  public	  police	  departments	  increasingly	  resemble	  military	  units,	  backed	  up	  by	  advanced	  surveillance	  technologies,	  weapons,	  and	  battle	  vehicles.	  These	  units,	  known	  as	  SWAT	  (Special	  Weapons	  and	  Tactics)	  teams,	  conduct	  raids	  in	  our	  communities	  that	  increasingly	  resemble	  Special	  Forces	  operations	  executed	  by	  the	  US	  military	  in	  war	  zones	  abroad.	  For	  instance,	  SWAT	  teams	  break	  down	  doors	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  night,	  dressed	  in	  combat	  gear,	  and	  hurl	  0lash-­‐bang	  grenades	  in	  civilian	  homes	  —	  too	  often	  merely	  to	  serve	  routine	  drug	  warrants.	  After	  more	  than	  a	  decade	  embroiled	  in	  wars	  abroad,	  the	  tactics,	  mentality,	  and	  tools	  deployed	  by	  the	  US	  military	  in	  overseas	  war	  operations	  are	  coming	  home	  to	  our	  cities	  and	  towns.	  	  !Law	  enforcement	  is	  a	  dif0icult	  job,	  and	  police	  of0icers	  are	  sometimes	  sent	  into	  very	  dangerous	  situations:	  active	  shooter,	  hostage,	  and	  violent	  barricade	  scenarios	  among	  them.	  Under	  these	  and	  a	  similar,	  limited,	  set	  of	  circumstances,	  militarized	  police	  raids	  may	  be	  appropriate.	  But	  all	  too	  often,	  as	  our	  review	  of	  open	  source	  material	  in	  Massachusetts	  and	  empirical	  0igures	  from	  other	  states	  show,	  SWAT	  raids	  in	  America	  are	  executed	  in	  drug-­‐related	  cases	  where	  there	  is	  no	  justi0iable	  use	  of	  such	  extreme	  force.	  Worse	  still,	  these	  militarized	  drug	  raids	  do	  not	  impact	  all	  Americans	  equally:	  unjusti0iable	  force	  and	  SWAT	  raids	  against	  people	  in	  their	  homes	  most	  often	  target	  people	  of	  color	  and	  the	  poor.	  The	  ACLU’s	  national	  of0ice	  recently	  found	  that	  the	  majority	  of	  people	  impacted	  by	  the	  more	  than	  800	  SWAT	  raids	  it	  investigated	  were	  people	  of	  color.	  	  !Perhaps	  no	  story	  illustrates	  this	  problem	  more	  locally—and	  tragically—than	  the	  2011	  death	  in	  Framingham	  of	  Eurie	  Stamps,	  an	  African-­‐American	  grandfather	  of	  twelve,	  in	  his	  own	  home.	  Using	  military-­‐style	  tactics,	  including	  the	  use	  of	  a	  battering	  ram	  to	  break	  down	  the	  door	  after	  midnight,	  the	  Framingham	  SWAT	  team	  raided	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Stamps’	  house	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  apprehend	  his	  stepson	  and	  another	  man	  suspected	  of	  dealing	  drugs,	  when	  an	  of0icer	  killed	  the	  elderly,	  unarmed	  Stamps.	  !This	  report	  details	  the	  toxic	  effects	  the	  so-­‐called	  “war	  on	  drugs”	  and	  “war	  on	  terror”	  are	  having	  in	  our	  communities—and	  their	  failure	  to	  address	  pressing	  public	  safety	  concerns.	  Revelations	  in	  this	  report	  include:	  !• Figures	  on	  the	  growing	  and	  unchecked	  transfer	  of	  military	  equipment	  to	  Massachusetts	  state	  and	  local	  police;	  !• Details	  about	  the	  adoption	  by	  local	  police	  of	  failed	  counterinsurgency	  battle0ield	  strategies	  and	  tactics	  in	  Massachusetts	  communities;	  	  !• Previously	  secret	  National	  Guard	  involvement	  in	  counterdrug	  operations	  in	  the	  Commonwealth;	  !• Federal	  funding	  for	  local	  “counterterrorism”	  projects	  where	  there	  is	  no	  threat	  of	  terrorism;	  !• Widespread	  secrecy	  by	  state	  and	  local	  law	  enforcement	  regarding	  the	  equipment,	  tactics	  and	  consequences	  of	  deploying	  military	  tactics	  against	  local	  residents	  in	  Massachusetts.	  	  !This	  brie0ing	  paper	  is	  released	  in	  tandem	  with	  a	  study	  published	  by	  the	  national	  ACLU,	  which	  describes	  police	  militarization	  in	  other	  states	  and	  surveys	  the	  national	  landscape.	  The	  nationwide	  report	  demonstrates	  empirically	  that	  the	  inappropriate	  SWAT	  raids	  it	  investigated	  were	  disproportionately	  carried	  out	  against	  communities	  of	  color,	  which	  can	  exacerbate	  tensions	  between	  communities	  and	  the	  police.	  Rather	  than	  enhance	  public	  safety,	  federally-­‐funded	  police	  militarization	  undermines	  police-­‐community	  relations,	  endangering	  people	  and	  threatening	  the	  character	  of	  our	  open	  society.	  Public	  records	  and	  open	  source	  information	  indicates	  a	  similar	  problem	  in	  Massachusetts.	  	  !This	  brie0ing	  paper,	  and	  the	  recommendations	  set	  forth	  at	  the	  end,	  is	  part	  of	  a	  growing	  body	  of	  literature	  calling	  for	  new	  public	  policy	  solutions	  to	  long-­‐term	  social	  problems	  such	  as	  substance	  abuse	  and	  poverty.	  Counter	  to	  the	  dominant	  approach	  to	  security	  in	  America,	  the	  inappropriate	  use	  of	  SWAT	  teams,	  increased	  surveillance,	  and	  the	  monitoring	  of	  dissidents	  will	  not	  make	  us	  a	  safer	  or	  healthier	  Commonwealth.	  !!
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Militarization of local police is fueled by the “wars” on 
drugs, terror, and dissent !The	  militarization	  of	  domestic	  law	  enforcement	  began	  in	  the	  1970s	  with	  the	  war	  on	  drugs,	  and	  has	  been	  fueled	  by	  billions	  of	  dollars	  in	  federal	  funding	  throughout	  the	  so-­‐called	  war	  on	  terror.	  	  !After	  the	  tragic	  Boston	  Marathon	  bombings	  in	  2013,	  then-­‐Boston	  Police	  Commissioner	  Ed	  Davis	  told	  Congress,	  “I	  do	  not	  endorse	  actions	  that	  move	  Boston	  and	  our	  nation	  into	  a	  police	  state	  mentality.”	  Despite	  this	  vow,	  the	  Commonwealth’s	  local	  police	  departments	  increasingly	  are	  adopting	  military	  weaponry,	  tactics	  and	  mindsets,	  often	  targeting	  poor	  and	  underserved	  communities,	  as	  well	  as	  people	  engaged	  in	  dissent	  and	  other	  forms	  of	  protected	  political	  speech.	  !In	  Massachusetts,	  many	  SWAT	  teams	  are	  operated	  by	  regional	  police	  department	  consortiums	  called	  Law	  Enforcement	  Councils	  (LECs).	  Approximately	  240	  of	  the	  351	  police	  departments	  in	  Massachusetts	  belong	  to	  an	  LEC.	  While	  set	  up	  as	  “corporations,”	  LECs	  are	  funded	  by	  local	  and	  federal	  taxpayer	  money,	  are	  composed	  exclusively	  of	  public	  police	  of0icers	  and	  sheriffs,	  and	  carry	  out	  traditional	  law	  enforcement	  functions	  through	  specialized	  units	  such	  as	  SWAT	  teams.	  	  !An	  additional	  25	  cities	  and	  towns	  maintain	  their	  own	  paramilitary	  police	  units	  (PPUs),	  and	  the	  State	  Police	  has	  a	  SWAT	  team	  of	  its	  own,	  called	  Special	  Tactical	  Operations	  (STOP).	  The	  Massachusetts	  Bay	  Transit	  Authority	  (MBTA)	  also	  maintains	  a	  SWAT	  force.	  !
Militarization of police in Massachusetts is shrouded in secrecy !In	  preparing	  this	  report,	  the	  ACLU	  of	  Massachusetts	  0iled	  numerous	  public	  records	  requests	  with	  Massachusetts	  police	  departments,	  drug	  task	  force	  operations,	  and	  regional	  Law	  Enforcement	  Councils,	  which	  operate	  regional	  SWAT	  teams.	  Most	  agencies	  denied	  our	  requests	  for	  public	  documents.	  	  !	  The	  federalization	  and	  militarization	  of	  local	  law	  enforcement—including	  with	  the	  US	  military—have	  taken	  place	  largely	  in	  the	  shadows,	  without	  democratic	  input	  or	  community	  oversight.	  Local	  Massachusetts	  police	  departments,	  for	  example,	  have	  largely	  refused	  to	  cooperate	  with	  ACLU	  requests	  for	  information	  about	  their	  SWAT	  activities.	  This	  failure	  to	  keep	  and	  make	  publicly	  available	  adequate	  records	  about	  SWAT	  raids	  obstructs	  the	  public’s	  view	  of	  police	  practices	  in	  Massachusetts,	  prohibiting	  the	  oversight	  necessary	  to	  prevent	  abuse	  and	  ensure	  democracy.	  Due	  to	  the	  weakness	  of	  Massachusetts	  public	  records	  law	  and	  the	  culture	  of	  secrecy	  that	  has	  infected	  local	  police	  departments	  and	  Law	  Enforcement	  Councils,	  procuring	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empirical	  records	  from	  police	  departments	  and	  regional	  SWAT	  teams	  in	  Massachusetts	  about	  police	  militarization	  was	  universally	  dif0icult	  and,	  in	  most	  instances,	  impossible.	  	  !The	  few	  documents	  obtained	  reveal	  that	  SWAT	  teams	  in	  Massachusetts	  do	  not	  keep	  adequate	  records.	  For	  example,	  there	  is	  no	  evidence	  of	  a	  standardized	  form	  in	  use	  across	  SWAT	  teams	  to	  document	  the	  reasons	  and	  justi0ications	  for	  deploying	  SWAT.	  Nor	  did	  the	  ACLU	  0ind	  evidence	  of	  any	  standard	  justi0ication	  or	  use-­‐of-­‐force	  policy	  across	  agencies	  statewide.	  Worse	  still,	  in	  light	  of	  SWAT	  teams’	  military-­‐style	  operations,	  there	  is	  no	  uniform	  after-­‐action	  documentation	  in	  use	  across	  departments.	  Some	  departments	  compile	  after-­‐action	  reports;	  others	  don’t.	  In	  some	  cases,	  the	  ACLU	  was	  told	  that	  compiling	  available	  records	  for	  disclosure	  would	  be	  too	  costly	  because	  after-­‐action	  reports	  are	  kept	  in	  individual	  case	  0iles,	  and	  are	  not	  stored	  in	  a	  centralized	  SWAT	  database.	  	  !The	  lack	  of	  standards,	  record	  keeping,	  and	  transparency	  poses	  serious	  threats	  to	  both	  public	  safety	  and	  democracy,	  and	  should	  be	  addressed	  immediately	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  both	  public	  record	  and	  public	  safety	  management.	  Police	  departments	  and	  regional	  SWAT	  teams	  are	  public	  institutions,	  working	  with	  public	  money,	  meant	  to	  protect	  and	  serve	  the	  public’s	  interest.	  If	  these	  institutions	  do	  not	  maintain	  and	  make	  public	  comprehensive	  and	  comprehensible	  documents	  pertaining	  to	  their	  operations	  and	  tactics,	  the	  people	  cannot	  judge	  whether	  of0icials	  are	  acting	  appropriately	  or	  make	  needed	  policy	  changes	  when	  problems	  arise.	  	  !In	  order	  to	  properly	  assess	  the	  value	  and	  dangers	  of	  using	  SWAT	  raids	  in	  speci0ic	  circumstances,	  and	  to	  examine	  the	  trends	  more	  broadly,	  departments	  should	  be	  required	  to	  adopt	  appropriate	  use-­‐of-­‐force	  policies	  and	  after-­‐action	  reports,	  while	  maintaining	  adequate	  records	  for	  periodic	  public	  examination.	  !Hiding	  behind	  the	  argument	  that	  they	  are	  private	  corporations	  not	  subject	  to	  the	  public	  records	  laws,	  the	  LECs	  have	  refused	  to	  provide	  documents	  regarding	  their	  SWAT	  team	  policies	  and	  procedures.	  They	  have	  also	  failed	  to	  disclose	  anything	  about	  their	  operations,	  including	  how	  many	  raids	  they	  have	  executed	  or	  for	  what	  purpose.	  !One	  SWAT	  team	  in	  Massachusetts	  was	  more	  transparent	  about	  its	  operations,	  but	  only	  after	  a	  deadly	  incident.	  Public	  pressure	  forced	  the	  production	  of	  information	  related	  to	  Framingham	  SWAT	  team	  operations	  after	  the	  team	  killed	  Eurie	  Stamps	  in	  January	  2011.	  This	  information	  revealed	  the	  Framingham	  team	  conducted	  “four	  high	  risk	  tactical	  missions”	  in	  2012	  —all	  of	  them	  related	  to	  serving	  warrants	  for	  narcotics	  charges.	  !But	  even	  the	  limited	  publicly	  available	  information	  about	  the	  LECs	  reveals	  patterns	  of	  militarizing	  police	  operations.	  METROLEC,	  one	  of	  the	  largest	  of	  the	  law	  enforcement	  councils	  covering	  the	  metropolitan	  Boston	  area,	  operates	  a	  range	  of	  specialized	  resources,	  including	  a	  Canine	  Unit,	  Computer	  Crimes	  Unit,	  Crisis	  Negotiation	  Team,	  Mobile	  Operations	  Motorcycle	  Unit,	  and	  Regional	  Response	  Team,	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in	  addition	  to	  its	  SWAT	  force.	  The	  organization	  maintains	  its	  own	  BearCat	  armored	  vehicle,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  $700,000	  state	  of	  the	  art	  command	  and	  control	  post.	  In	  2012,	  METROLEC	  reportedly	  used	  its	  BearCat	  26	  times,	  mostly	  for	  drug	  busts,	  and	  applied	  to	  the	  Federal	  Aviation	  Administration	  to	  obtain	  a	  drone	  license.	  !The	  North	  Eastern	  Massachusetts	  Law	  Enforcement	  Council	  (NEMLEC)	  similarly	  operates	  a	  SWAT	  team,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  Computer	  Crime	  Unit,	  Motorcycle	  Unit,	  School	  Threat	  Assessment	  &	  Response	  System,	  and	  Regional	  Communications	  and	  Incident	  Management	  Assistance	  Team.	  Its	  SWAT	  team	  members	  are	  trained	  and	  equipped	  to	  “deal	  with	  active	  shooters,	  armed	  barricaded	  subjects,	  hostage	  takers	  and	  terrorists,”	  and	  they	  dress	  in	  military-­‐style	  gear	  with	  the	  words	  “NEMLEC	  SWAT”	  emblazoned	  on	  their	  uniforms.	  Given	  this	  training,	  it	  is	  not	  surprising	  that	  the	  NEMLEC	  SWAT	  team	  has	  over	  the	  past	  decade	  led	  numerous	  operations	  that	  involved	  armored	  vehicles,	  0lash-­‐bang	  devices,	  and	  automatic	  weapons.	  !Despite	  the	  dif0icultly	  we	  had	  in	  obtaining	  what	  is	  effectively	  secret	  information	  about	  the	  details	  of	  SWAT	  activities	  in	  our	  state,	  available	  open	  source	  information	  about	  police	  trends	  in	  Massachusetts	  leads	  us	  to	  the	  same	  disturbing	  conclusions	  reached	  in	  the	  ACLU’s	  national	  report:	  police	  increasingly	  view	  our	  domestic	  communities	  as	  war	  zones,	  and	  are	  acting	  accordingly.	  Unfortunately,	  counterinsurgency	  tactics	  have	  proven	  to	  be	  ineffective	  at	  building	  a	  nation	  that	  is	  safe	  and	  free,	  whether	  at	  home	  or	  abroad.	  	  !
Hand-me-down militarization: tracking the transfer of surplus 
military weapons to state and local police !Massachusetts	  police	  departments	  have	  for	  years	  accepted	  equipment	  from	  the	  Department	  of	  Defense	  (DoD),	  free	  of	  charge.	  The	  transfers	  are	  governed	  by	  the	  US	  military’s	  1033	  program,	  which	  gives	  used	  DoD	  items	  to	  state	  and	  local	  law	  enforcement	  for	  “counter-­‐drug	  or	  counter-­‐terrorism	  activities.”	  State	  and	  local	  governments	  pay	  shipping	  costs	  and	  maintenance.	  !Between	  1994	  and	  2009,	  82	  police	  departments	  and	  other	  authorized	  agencies	  in	  Massachusetts	  received	  1,068	  military	  weapons	  from	  the	  DoD—including	  486	  fully	  automatic	  M-­‐16	  machine	  guns	  and	  564	  semi-­‐automatic	  M-­‐14s.	  While	  the	  State	  Police	  received	  the	  most	  weapons,	  departments	  in	  towns	  like	  Well0leet,	  Medford,	  Duxbury,	  and	  Hamilton	  also	  obtained	  machine	  guns	  from	  the	  military,	  free	  of	  charge.	  	  !West	  Spring0ield,	  Massachusetts,	  population	  28,137,	  got	  two	  grenade	  launchers	  through	  the	  1033	  program.	  	  !Massachusetts	  police	  departments	  also	  received	  0ive	  “peacekeeper	  armored	  vehicles”	  valued	  at	  $1	  million,	  771	  vehicles	  worth	  more	  than	  $11	  million,	  and	  large	  marine	  craft	  worth	  $300,000.	  In	  2012,	  Massachusetts	  agencies	  requested	  equipment	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worth	  over	  $2	  million	  from	  the	  DoD,	  including	  night	  vision	  goggles,	  binoculars,	  telescopes,	  computers,	  and	  trucks.	  !This	  acquisition	  of	  military	  equipment	  including	  powerful	  weapons	  happens	  without	  a	  process	  for	  public	  input.	  A	  Boston	  Globe	  report	  found	  that	  when	  it	  surveyed	  12	  Massachusetts	  police	  departments,	  not	  one	  had	  informed	  the	  public	  that	  it	  was	  getting	  free	  military	  weapons	  through	  the	  1033	  program.	  	  !That	  public	  engagement	  is	  crucial,	  because	  not	  all	  communities	  are	  eager	  to	  receive	  military	  weapons,	  even	  when	  the	  DoD	  is	  giving	  them	  away.	  	  !Some	  leadership	  has	  provided	  a	  rare	  but	  helpful	  counterexample.	  In	  May	  2009,	  then-­‐Mayor	  Menino	  of	  Boston	  rejected	  a	  plan	  for	  the	  BPD	  to	  obtain	  200	  high-­‐powered	  M16	  ri0les	  free	  of	  charge	  from	  the	  military.	  Then-­‐Commissioner	  Davis	  told	  the	  
Boston	  Globe,	  “The	  mayor	  has	  made	  it	  clear,	  and	  I	  agree,	  that	  this	  is	  not	  a	  weapon	  that	  an	  average	  patrol	  of0icer	  should	  have	  in	  his	  car	  or	  slung	  over	  his	  shoulder.”	  !However,	  despite	  that	  initial	  reluctance,	  four	  years	  later,	  the	  BPD	  announced	  plans	  to	  acquire	  100	  AR-­‐15	  assault	  ri0les,	  even	  though	  gun	  violence	  is	  on	  the	  decline	  in	  the	  city.	  Some	  members	  of	  the	  department	  aren’t	  convinced	  it’s	  the	  right	  path:	  “All	  of	  a	  sudden	  the	  department	  seems	  to	  be	  rushing	  into	  this,”	  president	  of	  the	  Boston	  Police	  Superior	  Of0icers	  Federation	  labor	  union,	  Jack	  Kervin,	  told	  Al	  Jazeera.	  “It	  isn’t	  like	  this	  is	  Fallujah	  or	  we’re	  in	  a	  war	  zone.”	  !
Militarizing local police does not 
make our communities safer !The	  increasing	  tendency	  of	  police	  to	  adopt	  military	  tactics	  against	  civilian	  residents	  has	  not	  led	  to	  better	  public	  safety	  outcomes.	  Rather,	  this	  approach	  evokes	  the	  warning	  that	  when	  all	  you	  have	  is	  a	  hammer,	  everything	  looks	  like	  a	  nail.	  	  !Federal	  efforts	  to	  induce	  local	  law	  enforcement	  to	  adopt	  counter-­‐insurgency	  and	  military	  tactics	  against	  civilians	  undermine	  community-­‐police	  relations	  and	  divert	  police	  energies	  away	  from	  solving	  crimes	  that	  have	  already	  occurred.	  Instead,	  local	  police	  become	  preoccupied	  with	  surveillance,	  military-­‐style	  strategies,	  and	  trying	  in	  vain	  to	  predict	  future	  crimes.	  The	  available	  statistics	  show	  that	  this	  0lood	  of	  money	  for	  surveillance	  and	  military	  gear	  has	  not	  made	  police	  better	  at	  solving	  serious	  crimes	  or	  stopping	  the	  0low	  of	  illegal	  drugs	  into	  our	  communities.	  	  !Instead,	  applying	  counterinsurgency	  tactics	  and	  a	  war-­‐zone	  mentality	  to	  problems	  that	  fundamentally	  originate	  from	  poverty	  and	  drug	  prohibition	  may	  actually	  undermine	  public	  safety.	  As	  Neill	  Franklin,	  executive	  director	  of	  Law	  Enforcement	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Against	  Prohibition	  (LEAP),	  writes,	  these	  neighborhood-­‐speci0ic,	  aggressive	  tactics	  may	  actually	  make	  our	  communities	  less	  safe:	  !“Prosecuting	  individual	  drug	  suppliers	  is	  a	  lot	  like	  squeezing	  a	  water	  balloon:	  when	  you	  tighten	  in	  one	  place,	  another	  part	  of	  the	  balloon	  necessarily	  expands	  out.	  The	  police	  might	  arrest	  a	  dealer	  in	  one	  area	  of	  the	  city,	  but	  when	  they	  do,	  they	  create	  a	  vacuum	  in	  the	  market	  which	  others	  enthusiastically	  0ill.	  Worse,	  the	  scramble	  to	  0ill	  that	  void	  often	  leads	  to	  violent	  confrontations	  between	  groups	  competing	  for	  market	  share.	  This	  is	  one	  way	  in	  which	  drug	  prohibition	  not	  only	  fails	  to	  prevent	  violence,	  it	  actively	  generates	  it.”	  !One	  important	  metric	  of	  the	  competence	  of	  public	  safety	  agencies	  is	  the	  murder	  clearance	  rate—what	  percentage	  of	  murders	  result	  in	  criminal	  charges.	  Despite	  the	  hundreds	  of	  millions	  of	  dollars	  in	  federal	  aid	  to	  state	  and	  local	  law	  enforcement	  for	  new	  technologies	  and	  weapons,	  homicide	  clearance	  rates	  in	  New	  England	  have	  fallen	  over	  the	  past	  decade.	  In	  2003,	  before	  the	  torrent	  of	  DHS	  money	  to	  state	  and	  local	  law	  enforcement	  for	  ‘intelligence-­‐led’	  policing,	  the	  murder	  clearance	  rate	  in	  New	  England	  stood	  at	  67.5%.	  Nine	  years	  later,	  in	  2012	  (the	  last	  year	  for	  which	  complete	  FBI	  statistics	  are	  available),	  the	  murder	  clearance	  rate	  in	  the	  region	  had	  actually	  fallen	  to	  61.8%.	  !Another	  important	  metric	  is	  drug	  abuse	  rates.	  Decades	  into	  the	  costly	  drug	  war,	  federal	  money	  to	  0ight	  it	  continues	  to	  0lood	  Massachusetts	  police	  departments—as	  illustrated	  in	  more	  detail	  below.	  But	  in	  April	  2014,	  Governor	  Deval	  Patrick	  declared	  a	  public	  health	  state	  of	  emergency	  as	  a	  result	  of	  a	  spike	  in	  opiate-­‐related	  deaths	  in	  Massachusetts.	  Drug	  prohibition	  and	  aggressive	  policing	  strategies	  to	  combat	  drug	  sales	  and	  use	  have	  not	  made	  a	  dent	  in	  either	  the	  supply	  or	  demand	  for	  drugs	  in	  our	  state,	  nor	  staved	  off	  the	  public	  health	  crisis	  that	  has	  emerged	  around	  substance	  abuse,	  notably	  opiate	  abuse.	  	  !The	  federally	  orchestrated	  militarization	  of	  the	  police	  is	  not	  making	  our	  communities	  safer.	  At	  a	  time	  when	  we	  should	  move	  away	  from	  failed	  drug-­‐war	  policies,	  providing	  them	  with	  more	  0irepower—0iguratively	  and	  literally—is	  a	  step	  in	  the	  wrong	  direction.	  	  !
Police militarization perpetuates the failed “war on drugs” !Despite	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  war	  on	  drugs	  is	  increasingly	  politically	  unpopular	  and	  an	  objective	  failure,	  federal	  aid	  to	  state	  and	  local	  law	  enforcement	  shows	  governments	  at	  all	  levels	  are	  doubling	  down	  on	  this	  colossal	  public	  policy	  disaster.	  The	  pain	  of	  the	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drug	  war	  isn’t	  only	  measured	  in	  lives	  lost	  to	  incarceration,	  the	  criminalization	  of	  youth	  of	  color	  and	  the	  poor,	  the	  waste	  of	  scarce	  public	  resources,	  or	  premature	  deaths.	  The	  drug	  war	  is	  also	  directly	  militarizing	  local	  police	  and	  worsening	  an	  already	  substantial	  secrecy	  problem	  at	  departments	  statewide.	  !Documents	  obtained	  by	  the	  ACLU	  of	  Massachusetts	  show	  that	  the	  Massachusetts	  National	  Guard	  is	  intimately	  engaged	  in	  0ighting	  the	  drug	  war	  in	  our	  state,	  applying	  battle0ield	  techniques	  at	  home.	  The	  Guard	  trains	  local	  law	  enforcement	  in	  military-­‐style	  tactics	  and	  operations	  and	  provides	  them	  access	  to	  military	  equipment.	  At	  least	  14	  National	  Guard	  employees	  work	  full-­‐time	  to	  provide	  police	  departments	  with	  drug	  war	  operational	  support.	  One	  National	  Guard	  counterdrug	  analyst	  works	  permanently	  at	  the	  Commonwealth	  Fusion	  Center,	  a	  State	  Police	  surveillance	  center.	  	  !Among	  the	  military	  equipment	  available	  to	  local	  police	  is	  “aircraft…[for]	  counterdrug	  aerial	  reconnaissance.”	  Military	  personnel	  available	  to	  work	  with	  domestic	  police	  are	  Guard	  members	  “uniquely	  trained,	  and	  often	  experienced	  on	  the	  battle0ield,	  to	  conduct	  0ield	  operations	  in	  both	  day	  and	  night	  conditions,”	  “personnel	  trained	  in	  counterdrug	  aerial	  reconnaissance	  techniques,”	  divers	  for	  underwater	  missions,	  and	  experts	  in	  maps	  and	  imagery.	  These	  National	  Guard	  counterdrug	  operations	  evidence	  a	  blurring	  of	  the	  lines	  between	  military	  and	  police	  missions.	  	  !Massachusetts	  also	  is	  home	  to	  more	  than	  20	  multiagency	  drug	  task	  force	  operations,	  due	  in	  part	  to	  funding	  from	  the	  Department	  of	  Justice’s	  Byrne	  grant	  program.	  Police	  and	  prosecutors	  from	  181	  cities	  and	  towns	  participate	  in	  these	  drug	  force	  operations	  alongside	  representatives	  of	  the	  FBI,	  DEA,	  ICE,	  and	  the	  National	  Guard.	  In	  2005	  alone,	  working	  with	  the	  assistance	  of	  1,000	  con0idential	  informants,	  these	  task	  forces	  conducted	  131	  drug	  investigations	  and	  seized	  over	  $2	  million	  through	  asset	  forfeiture.	  !One	  such	  task	  force	  operation,	  the	  New	  England	  High	  Intensity	  Drug	  Traf0icking	  Area	  (NEHIDTA),	  refused	  our	  request	  for	  public	  documents	  about	  its	  internal	  operations.	  When	  the	  ACLU	  of	  Massachusetts	  0iled	  a	  public	  records	  request	  with	  the	  NEHIDTA,	  a	  federally	  funded	  drug	  war	  operation	  staffed	  by	  public	  employees,	  the	  agency	  replied:	  “The	  NEHIDTA	  is	  NOT	  a	  government	  agency.	  The	  NEHIDTA	  is	  a	  grant	  program	  administered	  by	  the	  Of0ice	  of	  National	  Drug	  Control	  Policy…but	  is	  not	  part	  of	  the	  ONDCP…Under	  Federal	  Law,	  HIDTAs	  are	  not	  legal	  entities	  capable	  of	  possessing	  any	  information.	  Rather,	  HIDTAs	  are	  coalitions	  that	  serve	  ministerial	  and	  administrative	  functions.	  Any	  information	  that	  passes	  through	  a	  HIDTA	  remains	  the	  sole	  property	  of	  the	  originating	  agency,	  and	  NOT	  the	  property	  of	  the	  HIDTA.”	  	  !Despite	  the	  NEHIDTA’s	  assertion	  that	  it	  is	  not	  a	  government	  agency,	  the	  Department	  of	  Justice	  website	  makes	  clear	  that	  these	  are	  government-­‐run	  operations.	  	  !The	  Drug	  Enforcement	  Agency	  states	  on	  its	  website	  that	  HIDTAs	  provide	  “a	  federal	  presence	  in	  sparsely	  populated	  areas	  where	  the	  DEA	  would	  not	  otherwise	  be	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represented.”	  These	  task	  force	  operations	  combine	  “federal	  leverage	  and	  the	  specialists	  available	  to	  the	  DEA	  with	  state	  and	  local	  of0icers’	  investigative	  talents	  and	  detailed	  knowledge	  of	  their	  jurisdiction	  [leading]	  to	  highly	  effective	  drug	  law	  enforcement	  investigations,”	  the	  DEA	  claims.	  But	  despite	  this	  lofty	  rhetoric,	  narcotics	  are	  cheaper,	  more	  potent,	  and	  more	  accessible	  than	  ever	  before	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  !The	  drug	  war	  has	  militarized	  our	  police	  and	  contributed	  to	  the	  growing	  secrecy	  problem	  in	  local	  law	  enforcement,	  but	  it	  hasn’t	  made	  a	  dent	  in	  the	  drug	  trade.	  Efforts	  underway	  in	  Spring0ield,	  Massachusetts	  illustrate	  that	  this	  failure	  has	  not	  stopped	  of0icials	  at	  all	  levels	  from	  doubling	  down	  on	  failed	  policies.	  !
The enemy within: deploying 
counterinsurgency tactics in 
Massachusetts communities !Police	  of0icers	  increasingly	  are	  trained	  to	  view	  themselves	  as	  soldiers	  in	  a	  war	  against	  criminals,	  instead	  of	  public	  servants	  hired	  to	  serve	  and	  defend	  our	  communities.	  In	  Massachusetts,	  law	  enforcement's	  adoption	  of	  military	  tactics	  and	  a	  military	  mindset	  has	  catalyzed	  this	  process.	  !One	  explicitly	  military	  model	  has	  been	  adopted	  by	  law	  enforcement	  in	  Spring0ield	  and	  South	  Holyoke.	  A	  former	  Green	  Beret	  who	  is	  also	  a	  Massachusetts	  state	  trooper,	  Michael	  Cutone,	  brought	  C3	  Policing—Counter	  Criminal	  Continuum—to	  Spring0ield.	  On	  his	  return	  from	  Iraq	  in	  2009,	  he	  and	  Thomas	  Sarrouf,	  another	  state	  trooper	  who	  had	  been	  in	  Special	  Forces	  in	  the	  Avghani	  region	  of	  Iraq,	  reportedly	  sold	  Spring0ield’s	  then-­‐deputy	  police	  chief	  John	  Barbieri	  on	  their	  plan	  to	  adopt	  the	  Afghani	  Counterinsurgency	  Operations	  (COIN)	  model	  in	  Spring0ield’s	  North	  End.	  	  !According	  to	  an	  article	  in	  the	  scienti0ic	  journal	  Nature,	  “When	  Cutone	  returned	  from	  Iraq,	  he	  realized	  that	  the	  chaos	  he	  saw	  in	  Spring0ield	  bore	  a	  strong	  resemblance	  to	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“In America black people are treated 
very much…[as] any other colonized 
people because we're used, we're 
brutalized. The police in our 
community occupy our area—our 
community—as the foreign troops 
occupy territory. And the police, they 
are not…in our community…to 
promote welfare or our security, our 
safety, but they are there to contain 
us, to brutalize us…The police in our 
community couldn't possibly be there 
to protect our property because we 
own no property. They couldn't 
possibly be there to see that we 
receive the due process of law for the 
simple reason that the police 
themselves deny us the due process 
of law, so it's very apparent that the 
police in our community are not for 
our security, but the security of the 
business owners in the community 
and also to see that the status quo is 
kept intact.” 
 – Huey P. Newton, 1968
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what	  he	  had	  seen	  in	  northern	  Iraq	  where	  he	  had	  been	  employed.”	  In	  this	  approach,	  so-­‐called	  “gangs”	  in	  the	  North	  End	  of	  Spring0ield	  were	  equated	  with	  insurgents	  on	  a	  foreign	  battle0ield.	  In	  this	  battle0ield	  theory,	  gangs,	  like	  insurgents,	  would	  targeted	  for	  intelligence	  collection	  by	  turning	  the	  local	  population	  into	  the	  “eyes	  and	  ears”	  of	  militarized	  law	  enforcement	  in	  return	  for	  promises	  of	  enhanced	  security.	  	  !In	  Spring0ield,	  C3	  Policing	  includes	  regular	  meetings	  for	  Spring0ield	  residents	  of	  the	  North	  End	  neighborhood	  to	  give	  “actionable	  intelligence”	  about	  crime,	  as	  well	  as	  ideas	  about	  how	  to	  “reduce	  gang	  activity	  and	  violence.”	  Kit	  Parker,	  a	  US	  army	  major	  teaching	  and	  researching	  at	  Harvard	  University	  after	  returning	  from	  Afghanistan,	  provided	  the	  intelligence	  analysis	  component.	  	  !Parker	  reportedly	  has	  involved	  college	  students	  in	  C3	  policing	  in	  order	  to	  “to	  bolster	  the	  initiative	  with	  state-­‐of-­‐the	  art	  data-­‐gathering	  and	  analysis.”	  This	  Harvard	  class,	  located	  some	  89	  miles	  away	  from	  Spring0ield,	  created	  a	  “war	  room”	  where	  students	  analyze	  information	  collected	  on	  “gang	  members	  and	  criminals”	  by	  using	  Lighthouse,	  a	  military	  data-­‐collection	  system	  developed	  to	  gather	  information	  on	  insurgents	  in	  Afghanistan.	  The	  students	  perform	  data-­‐mining	  and	  link	  analysis	  to	  map	  connections	  and	  associations	  as	  state	  troopers	  collect	  data	  on	  criminal	  histories,	  social	  networks,	  biometrics,	  and	  tattoos	  when	  they	  book	  suspects.	  	  !Major	  Parker	  “acknowledges	  that	  a	  domestic	  theory	  of	  counterinsurgency	  is	  a	  tough	  sell	  when	  many	  believe	  it	  has	  failed	  abroad.”	  Meanwhile,	  State	  Trooper	  Cutone—who	  has	  registered	  “C3	  Policing”	  as	  a	  privately-­‐owned	  trademark—reportedly	  has	  advised	  police	  departments	  from	  neighboring	  South	  Holyoke	  to	  Salinas,	  California	  on	  using	  counterinsurgency	  tactics	  against	  civilian	  populations.	  	  !While	  detailed	  metrics	  on	  the	  C3	  program	  remain	  secret,	  some	  of	  the	  most	  illuminating	  information	  the	  ACLU	  obtained	  about	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  counterinsurgency	  model	  in	  Spring0ield	  comes	  from	  grant	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Predictive policing, sometimes 
known as “intelligence-led 
policing” is a surveillance-
driven, data-heavy approach to 
pre-empting crimes before they 
occur. Complicated algorithms 
sold to police departments by 
CIA-linked firms like Palantir 
purport to crunch crime data 
and spit out information about 
where crimes are likely to occur 
in the future, based on past 
trends. There are many 
problems with this approach, 
foremost among them that it 
hasn’t been proven to work, and 
that it reinforces deep 
inequalities in the criminal 
justice system. Predictive 
policing reproduces decades of 
racially biased policing, through 
a supposedly “neutral” 
computer program, producing a 
feedback loop of injustice that is 
sold as objective and 
progressive. Read more about 
the problems with predictive 
policing.
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application	  documents	  the	  city	  and	  police	  department	  0iled	  with	  the	  Department	  of	  Justice	  in	  2013.	  In	  October	  2013,	  the	  Department	  of	  Justice’s	  Byrne	  Criminal	  Justice	  Innovation	  (BCJI)	  grant	  program,	  overseen	  by	  the	  Bureau	  of	  Justice	  Assistance,	  awarded	  the	  City	  of	  Spring0ield	  $1,000,000	  to	  expand	  its	  counterinsurgency	  policing	  to	  the	  South	  End	  neighborhood.	  The	  city’s	  grant	  application	  for	  DOJ	  funds	  suggests	  that	  the	  C3	  system	  perpetuates	  many	  of	  the	  worst	  aspects	  of	  decades-­‐old,	  failed,	  discriminatory	  drug-­‐war	  policies.	  	  !The	  program	  abstract	  submitted	  to	  DOJ,	  for	  example,	  states	  that	  the	  primary	  objective	  of	  the	  C3	  model	  is	  to	  “close	  down	  the	  area’s	  open	  drug	  market	  and	  reduce	  violent	  crime	  in	  the	  neighborhood	  by	  disrupting,	  denying,	  degrading,	  and	  displacing	  drug	  dealing	  and	  related	  criminal	  activity.”	  To	  achieve	  that	  goal,	  the	  police	  will	  conduct	  “data	  gathering	  and	  analysis,”	  encourage	  local	  residents	  to	  “call	  and/or	  text-­‐a-­‐tip…to	  police”,	  “increase	  the	  number	  of	  arrests	  made	  in	  the	  neighborhood	  from	  the	  baseline	  to	  30%	  above	  baseline	  in	  the	  0irst	  year	  of	  implementation,”	  and	  deploy	  “intelligence-­‐led	  policing.”	  	  !Rather	  than	  focus	  on	  violent	  offenders,	  however,	  the	  C3	  model	  focuses	  resources	  on	  “increased	  misdemeanor	  arrests/intensive	  law	  enforcement,”	  involving	  “aggressive	  order	  maintenance	  techniques,	  including	  making	  arrests	  for	  public	  order	  violations,	  arresting	  drug	  dealers,	  [and]	  conducting	  ‘stop	  and	  frisks’	  of	  suspicious	  individuals.”	  !The	  focus	  on	  low-­‐level,	  non-­‐violent	  offenders	  and	  heightened	  use	  of	  “stop	  and	  frisk”	  tactics	  is	  notable,	  particularly	  at	  a	  time	  when	  stop	  and	  frisk	  policies	  are	  coming	  under	  0ire	  nationwide	  for	  their	  disparate	  racial	  impact.	  	  !Moreover,	  despite	  the	  reported	  failure	  of	  counterinsurgency	  strategies	  in	  Afghanistan	  and	  Iraq,	  the	  City	  of	  Spring0ield	  has	  pointed	  to	  these	  as	  models	  for	  their	  domestic	  counterinsurgency	  strategy.	  “It	  is	  a	  domestic	  adaptation	  of	  the	  highly	  effective	  Counterinsurgency	  Operations	  (COIN)	  strategy	  used	  in	  Afghanistan,”	  the	  city	  wrote	  to	  DOJ,	  seeking	  funds	  for	  C3	  policing.	  	  !Supporters	  of	  counterinsurgency	  policing	  in	  Spring0ield	  claim	  that	  C3	  policing	  strategies	  drove	  crime	  down	  62%	  in	  the	  North	  End	  neighborhood	  in	  just	  one	  year.	  But	  despite	  the	  involvement	  of	  criminologists	  and	  Harvard	  researchers	  tasked	  with	  examining	  data	  trends	  and	  preparing	  quarterly	  reports,	  this	  one	  statistic	  remains	  the	  only	  publicly	  available	  metric	  about	  the	  program’s	  ef0icacy.	  Despite	  ACLU	  requests,	  no	  information	  has	  been	  made	  publicly	  available	  about	  what	  kinds	  of	  crimes	  decreased,	  which	  did	  not,	  or	  citywide	  trends.	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!Perhaps	  that’s	  because	  the	  contextual	  statistics	  paint	  a	  very	  different	  picture.	  In	  fact,	  Spring0ield	  was	  ranked	  as	  the	  10th	  most	  dangerous	  mid-­‐sized	  city	  in	  the	  nation	  in	  2013,	  in	  which	  nearly	  all	  indicators	  of	  violent	  crime	  had	  increased	  since	  2012,	  according	  to	  the	  website	  Law	  Street,	  which	  examined	  available	  FBI	  crime	  data.	  Preliminary	  trend	  data	  showed	  that	  the	  murder	  rate	  was	  up	  a	  whopping	  83%	  over	  2012	  0igures.	  Unsurprisingly,	  the	  City	  didn’t	  mention	  that	  in	  its	  2103	  application	  to	  the	  DOJ.	  !An	  ACLU	  of	  Massachusetts	  public	  records	  request	  to	  the	  City	  of	  Spring0ield	  pertaining	  to	  C3	  policing	  demonstrates	  that	  the	  City	  is	  deeply	  invested	  in	  the	  “counterinsurgency”	  model,	  but	  possesses	  no	  of0icial	  policies	  or	  internal	  procedures	  to	  monitor	  or	  oversee	  its	  implementation.	  While	  the	  department	  claimed	  to	  have	  no	  internal	  policies	  or	  procedures	  related	  to	  C3	  policing,	  it	  told	  the	  ACLU	  that	  it	  would	  have	  to	  pay	  $53,000	  to	  obtain	  other	  C3	  documents—including	  over	  35,000	  emails	  and	  700	  pages	  of	  overtime	  records	  that	  remain	  hidden	  from	  public	  scrutiny	  and	  oversight.	  	  !
The war on terror comes home: federal dollars fuel local surveillance 
and attacks on dissent  !In	  2012	  and	  2014,	  civil	  liberties	  groups	  including	  the	  ACLU	  published	  documents	  revealing	  that	  the	  Boston	  Regional	  Intelligence	  Center	  (“BRIC”)	  extensively	  monitored	  lawful	  First	  Amendment	  political	  activity.	  The	  BRIC	  0iles,	  detailed	  in	  our	  2012	  report	  “Policing	  Dissent,”	  described	  antiwar	  activists	  like	  Veterans	  for	  Peace	  as	  “extremists”	  and	  homeland	  security	  threats.	  Documents	  released	  in	  2014	  revealed	  that	  of0icials	  kept	  tabs	  on	  the	  political	  speech	  of	  law-­‐abiding	  Occupy	  Boston	  participants	  including	  Marty	  Walsh,	  who	  went	  on	  to	  become	  Mayor	  of	  Boston.	  !As	  police	  militarize,	  they	  also	  integrate	  with	  federal	  intelligence	  agencies	  engaged	  in	  domestic	  surveillance.	  The	  federalization	  process,	  like	  police	  militarization,	  is	  driven	  largely	  by	  federal	  funding	  and	  has	  swept	  across	  Massachusetts	  largely	  in	  secret.	  While	  federal	  funds	  are	  often	  provided	  to	  local	  law	  enforcement	  under	  the	  guise	  of	  0ighting	  a	  “war	  on	  terror,”	  expenditures	  ostensibly	  earmarked	  for	  counterterrorism	  too	  often	  end	  up	  instead	  being	  used	  to	  track	  ordinary	  Americans	  engaged	  in	  protected	  political	  speech.	  	  !While	  struggling	  with	  budget	  cuts,	  police	  departments	  statewide	  nonetheless	  have	  received	  hundreds	  of	  millions	  of	  dollars	  in	  federal	  assistance	  to	  buy	  advanced	  surveillance	  technology,	  including	  license	  plate	  readers,	  night	  vision	  goggles,	  biometrics	  databases,	  data-­‐mining	  algorithms,	  and	  networked	  surveillance	  cameras.	  Local	  law	  enforcement	  is	  cashing	  in	  on	  the	  homeland	  security	  craze,	  with	  sometimes	  troubling	  results:	  !
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Massachusetts	  has	  received	  more	  than	  $943	  million	  from	  FEMA	  alone	  since	  2002	  for	  what	  of0icials	  describe	  as	  antiterrorism	  purposes.	  Millions	  of	  dollars	  from	  those	  funding	  streams	  were	  fed	  into	  the	  development	  of	  so-­‐called	  “fusion	  centers”,	  the	  Boston	  Regional	  Intelligence	  Center	  (BRIC)	  and	  the	  Commonwealth	  Fusion	  Center	  (CFC).	  !• In	  2013,	  Boston	  received	  $17.5	  million	  in	  DHS	  grant	  funds	  for	  antiterrorism	  programs,	  including	  allocations	  for	  the	  BRIC.	  !• In	  2007,	  $6	  million	  in	  funds	  from	  the	  DOJ’s	  misnamed	  Community	  Oriented	  Police	  Services	  (COPS)	  grant	  supported	  enhanced	  data	  sharing	  and	  “cutting	  edge-­‐crime	  0ighting	  technologies”	  for	  state	  and	  local	  police.	  Among	  the	  resulting	  efforts	  was	  the	  implementation	  statewide	  of	  a	  criminal	  intelligence	  system	  that	  automatically	  “links	  individuals	  with	  associates,	  locations,	  and	  vehicles.”	  	  !• In	  2012,	  federal	  DHS	  funds	  paid	  for	  Massachusetts	  police	  of0icials’	  purchases	  of	  0ive	  BearCat	  armored	  vehicles.	  The	  enormous	  trucks	  cost	  approximately	  $250,000	  apiece.	  There	  is	  usually	  no	  democratic	  process	  to	  determine	  whether	  residents	  of	  municipalities	  want	  or	  need	  these	  enormous	  vehicles.	  Since	  the	  tools	  are	  “free”—except	  for	  upkeep	  and	  maintenance—local	  governments	  often	  approve	  their	  acceptance	  with	  a	  rubber	  stamp,	  or	  even	  in	  the	  face	  of	  local	  protest.	  	  !• The	  quiet	  college	  town	  of	  Northampton,	  population	  28,629,	  sought	  federal	  funds	  to	  purchase	  portable	  surveillance	  equipment	  it	  claimed	  it	  needed	  to	  deal	  with	  emergencies	  including	  “major	  civil	  disorder.”	  	  !• Wellesley,	  population	  26,613,	  sought	  funds	  to	  purchase	  computers	  and	  software	  for	  patrol	  of0icers	  so	  they	  could	  “query	  people	  they	  come	  in	  contact	  with”	  in	  various	  intelligence	  databases,	  including	  those	  maintained	  by	  regional	  fusion	  centers.	  	  !While	  the	  US	  military	  is	  working	  to	  train	  state	  and	  local	  law	  enforcement	  in	  drug	  war	  tactics,	  and	  local	  fusion	  centers	  are	  busy	  spying	  on	  dissenters,	  the	  Pentagon	  has	  its	  own	  plans	  to	  counter	  peaceful	  social	  and	  political	  change	  that	  threatens	  the	  status	  quo.	  Writes	  the	  Guardian:	  !“[T]he	  Pentagon's	  Human	  Terrain	  Systems	  (HTS)	  program—designed	  to	  embed	  social	  scientists	  in	  military	  0ield	  operations—routinely	  conducted	  training	  scenarios	  set	  in	  regions	  ‘within	  the	  United	  States.’	  !“…[T]he	  HTS	  training	  scenarios	  ‘adapted	  COIN	  [counterinsurgency]	  for	  Afghanistan/Iraq’	  to	  domestic	  situations	  ‘in	  the	  USA	  where	  the	  local	  population	  was	  seen	  from	  the	  military	  perspective	  as	  threatening	  the	  established	  balance	  of	  power	  and	  in0luence,	  and	  challenging	  law	  and	  order.’	  !
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“One	  war-­‐game…involved	  environmental	  activists	  protesting	  pollution	  from	  a	  coal-­‐0ired	  plant	  near	  Missouri,	  some	  of	  whom	  were	  members	  of	  the	  well-­‐known	  environmental	  NGO	  Sierra	  Club.	  Participants	  were	  tasked	  to	  ‘identify	  those	  who	  were	  'problem-­‐solvers'	  and	  those	  who	  were	  'problem-­‐causers,'	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  population	  whom	  would	  be	  the	  target	  of	  the	  information	  operations	  to	  move	  their	  Center	  of	  Gravity	  toward	  that	  set	  of	  viewpoints	  and	  values	  which	  was	  the	  'desired	  end-­‐state'	  of	  the	  military's	  strategy.’”	  !
Conclusion 	  !Largely	  in	  secret	  and	  absent	  community	  input,	  local	  police	  departments	  quietly	  are	  being	  turned	  into	  forces	  resembling	  military	  units.	  They	  are	  stocked	  with	  surplus	  equipment	  from	  the	  Department	  of	  Defense	  and	  trained	  by	  military	  personnel	  who	  have	  returned	  from	  overseas	  wars	  with	  battle0ield	  experience	  and	  battle0ield	  mentalities.	  Since	  9/11,	  billions	  of	  federal	  dollars	  have	  0looded	  state	  and	  local	  police	  departments,	  usually	  for	  purposes	  at	  odds	  with	  community	  policing.	  	  !The	  war	  on	  drugs	  is	  increasingly	  unpopular	  and	  the	  mass	  incarceration	  epidemic	  it	  spawned	  is	  the	  target	  of	  0ierce	  criticism	  across	  the	  political	  spectrum.	  Massachusetts	  voters	  have	  now	  twice	  moved	  to	  decriminalize	  marijuana.	  Despite	  growing	  public	  sentiment	  against	  the	  war	  on	  drugs,	  the	  federal	  government’s	  involvement	  in	  Massachusetts	  counterdrug	  operations	  continues	  to	  focuses	  public	  tax	  dollars	  on	  tactics,	  equipment	  and	  a	  drug-­‐warrior	  culture	  within	  local	  police	  departments.	  The	  result	  is	  the	  erosion	  of	  community	  trust,	  disproportionate	  targeting	  of	  people	  of	  color,	  and	  the	  documented	  failure	  of	  these	  policies	  to	  stem	  the	  0low	  of	  drugs	  into	  our	  communities.	  !As	  Jack	  Kervin	  of	  the	  Boston	  Police	  Superior	  Of0icers	  Federation	  said,	  our	  communities	  are	  not	  war	  zones.	  The	  militarization	  of	  the	  police	  fails	  to	  0ix	  what	  most	  endangers	  our	  communities,	  namely,	  issues	  of	  poverty,	  inadequate	  education	  and	  public	  health.	  	  !!
ACLU of Massachusetts Briefing Paper   MILITARIZATION OF LOCAL POLICE   June 2014 
  15
Recommendations to state and local policymakers !In	  order	  to	  reorient	  our	  police	  to	  protect	  and	  serve	  our	  communities,	  Massachusetts	  must	  end	  the	  failed	  war	  on	  drugs,	  reinvigorate	  local	  decision-­‐making	  bodies,	  update	  our	  public	  records	  laws,	  and	  halt	  the	  unchecked	  0low	  of	  federal	  funds	  to	  local	  law	  enforcement	  for	  battle0ield	  weapons,	  domestic	  surveillance,	  and	  counterinsurgency	  tactics.	  	  !The	  ACLU	  of	  Massachusetts,	  in	  concert	  with	  the	  national	  ACLU,	  makes	  the	  following	  recommendations	  for	  public	  policy	  makers	  at	  the	  state	  and	  local	  levels.	  !
Recommendations to the Massachusetts Legislature !1.	  Massachusetts	  should	  enact	  laws	  encouraging	  the	  restrained	  and	  appropriate	  use	  of	  SWAT	  teams,	  tactical	  teams,	  and	  Law	  Enforcement	  Council	  teams	  (“SWAT	  teams”).	  Tactical	  deployments	  should	  be	  limited	  to	  scenarios	  in	  which	  there	  is	  a	  likelihood	  that	  the	  situation	  for	  which	  the	  SWAT	  team	  is	  being	  deployed	  presents	  an	  imminent	  threat	  to	  the	  lives	  of	  civilians	  and/or	  police	  personnel.	  When	  SWAT	  teams	  are	  deployed	  for	  warrant	  service,	  the	  basis	  for	  believing	  such	  a	  likelihood	  exists	  should	  have	  to	  be	  established	  and	  approved	  by	  a	  supervisor	  or	  other	  high-­‐ranking	  of0icial	  before	  the	  deployment.	  	  	  2.	  Massachusetts	  should	  enact	  laws	  requiring	  that	  evidence	  obtained	  in	  violation	  of	  the	  traditional	  rule—which	  requires	  police	  to	  knock	  and	  announce	  their	  presence—should	  be	  excluded	  from	  any	  subsequent	  legal	  proceedings.	  !3.	  Massachusetts	  should	  enact	  laws	  requiring	  transparency	  and	  oversight	  of	  state	  and	  local	  law	  enforcement	  use	  of	  SWAT	  teams.	  !• The	  law	  should	  require	  local	  law	  enforcement	  agencies	  that	  maintain	  a	  SWAT	  team	  to	  use	  a	  standardized	  form	  to	  record	  speci0ic	  data	  related	  to	  SWAT	  deployments.	  These	  forms	  should	  be	  used	  to	  generate	  quarterly	  reports.	  	  !• The	  law	  should	  require	  every	  state	  or	  local	  law	  enforcement	  agency	  that	  maintains	  a	  SWAT	  team	  to	  submit	  a	  quarterly	  report	  to	  the	  legislature	  that	  contains	  the	  number	  of	  times	  the	  SWAT	  team	  was	  activated	  or	  deployed,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  following	  for	  each	  activation/deployment:	  the	  address	  of	  the	  location	  of	  activation/deployment;	  the	  reason	  for	  each	  activation/deployment;	  the	  factors	  establishing	  compliance	  with	  the	  applicable	  deployment	  standard;	  whether	  forcible	  entry	  or	  a	  breach	  was	  conducted	  and,	  if	  so,	  the	  equipment	  used	  in	  forcing	  the	  entry	  or	  conducting	  the	  breach	  and	  for	  what	  purpose;	  whether	  a	  distraction	  device	  was	  used	  and,	  if	  so,	  what	  type	  and	  for	  what	  purpose;	  whether	  an	  armored	  personnel	  carrier	  was	  used	  and,	  if	  so,	  for	  what	  purpose;	  the	  race,	  sex,	  and	  age	  of	  each	  individual	  encountered	  during	  the	  deployment,	  whether	  as	  a	  suspect	  or	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bystander;	  whether	  any	  civilians,	  of0icers,	  or	  domestic	  animals	  sustained	  any	  injury	  or	  death;	  and	  a	  list	  of	  any	  controlled	  substances,	  weapons,	  contraband,	  or	  evidence	  of	  crime	  found	  on	  the	  premises	  or	  any	  individuals.	  	  !• The	  law	  should	  ensure	  that	  there	  is	  an	  agency	  responsible	  for	  overseeing	  and	  monitoring	  SWAT	  activity,	  and	  for	  implementing	  necessary	  reforms,	  including	  developing	  a	  process	  for	  addressing	  civilian	  complaints	  regarding	  SWAT	  tactics.	  	  !
Recommendations to Local Governments and Law Enforcement 
Agencies !1.	  As	  an	  immediate	  step,	  law	  enforcement	  agencies	  should	  adopt	  internal	  deployment	  standards	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  local	  policy.	  Tactical	  deployments	  should	  be	  limited	  to	  scenarios	  in	  which	  there	  is	  a	  likelihood	  that	  the	  situation	  for	  which	  the	  SWAT	  team	  is	  being	  deployed	  presents	  an	  imminent	  threat	  to	  the	  lives	  of	  civilians	  and/or	  police	  personnel.	  When	  SWAT	  is	  deployed	  for	  warrant	  service,	  the	  basis	  for	  believing	  such	  a	  likelihood	  exists	  should	  have	  to	  be	  established	  and	  approved	  by	  a	  supervisor	  or	  other	  high-­‐ranking	  of0icial	  before	  the	  deployment.	  !2.	  Law	  enforcement	  agencies	  should	  adopt	  local	  policies	  requiring	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  following	  best	  practices	  in	  the	  use	  of	  SWAT	  teams.	  !• Each	  deployment	  should	  be	  pre-­‐approved	  by	  a	  supervisor	  or	  other	  high-­‐ranking	  of0icial.	  	  !• Each	  deployment	  should	  be	  preceded	  by	  a	  written	  planning	  process	  that	  documents	  the	  speci0ic	  need	  for	  the	  deployment,	  describes	  how	  the	  operation	  is	  to	  be	  conducted,	  and	  states	  whether	  children,	  pregnant	  women,	  and/or	  elderly	  people	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  present	  (except	  in	  emergency	  scenarios	  in	  which	  engaging	  in	  such	  a	  process	  would	  endanger	  the	  lives	  or	  well-­‐being	  of	  civilians	  or	  police	  personnel).	  	  !• All	  SWAT	  deployments	  should	  include	  a	  trained	  crisis	  negotiator.	  	  !• SWAT	  of0icers	  should	  wear	  “on-­‐of0icer	  recording	  systems”	  (so-­‐called	  “body	  cameras”)	  during	  deployments,	  and	  police	  departments	  should	  have	  in	  place	  rigorous	  safeguards	  regarding	  the	  retention,	  use,	  access,	  and	  disclosure	  of	  data	  captured	  by	  such	  systems.	  	  !• All	  deployments	  should	  be	  proportional	  to	  the	  need;	  a	  full	  deployment	  consisting	  of	  numerous	  heavily	  armed	  of0icers	  in	  an	  armored	  personnel	  carrier	  is	  often	  excessive.	  Many	  scenarios	  do	  not	  necessitate	  the	  use	  of	  a	  SWAT	  team	  at	  all,	  and	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partial	  deployments	  involving	  the	  minimal	  amount	  of	  military	  equipment	  necessary	  should	  be	  encouraged.	  	  !• For	  each	  SWAT	  deployment,	  a	  post-­‐deployment	  record	  should	  be	  made	  that	  documents	  the	  following,	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  allows	  for	  the	  data	  to	  be	  easily	  compiled	  and	  analyzed:	  	  
- The	  purpose	  of	  the	  deployment.	  	  
- The	  speci0ic	  reason	  for	  believing	  that	  a	  suspect	  was	  in	  the	  process	  of	  committing	  an	  act	  or	  threat	  of	  serious	  violence	  toward	  another;	  there	  was	  a	  reasonable	  and	  articulable	  basis	  for	  believing	  that	  a	  suspect	  was	  presently	  armed;	  or	  there	  was	  a	  reasonable	  and	  articulable	  basis	  for	  believing	  the	  situation	  for	  which	  the	  SWAT	  team	  was	  being	  deployed	  presented	  an	  imminent	  threat	  to	  the	  lives	  or	  safety	  of	  civilians	  and/or	  police	  personnel.	  	  
- Whether	  forcible	  entry	  or	  a	  breach	  was	  conducted	  and,	  if	  so,	  the	  equipment	  used	  and	  for	  what	  purpose.	  
- Whether	  a	  distraction	  device	  was	  used	  and,	  if	  so,	  what	  type	  and	  for	  what	  purpose.	  
- Whether	  an	  armored	  personnel	  carrier	  was	  used	  and,	  if	  so,	  for	  what	  purpose.	  
- The	  race,	  sex,	  and	  age	  of	  each	  individual	  encountered	  during	  the	  deployment,	  whether	  as	  a	  suspect	  or	  bystander.	  
- Whether	  any	  civilians,	  of0icers,	  or	  domestic	  animals	  sustained	  any	  injury	  or	  death.	  	  
- A	  list	  of	  any	  controlled	  substances,	  weapons,	  contraband,	  or	  evidence	  of	  crime	  that	  is	  found	  on	  the	  premises	  or	  any	  individuals.	  	  
- A	  brief	  narrative	  statement	  describing	  any	  unusual	  circumstances	  or	  important	  data	  elements	  not	  captured	  in	  the	  list	  above.	  !• Law	  enforcement	  agencies	  should	  provide	  training	  programs	  for	  all	  SWAT	  teams	  that	  do	  not	  promote	  an	  overly	  aggressive	  or	  “warrior”	  mentality.	  	  !3.	  Local	  and	  county	  governments	  should	  ensure	  that	  there	  is	  an	  agency	  responsible	  for	  ensuring	  that	  its	  police	  are	  not	  militarized.	  Such	  responsibilities	  should	  include	  the	  following:	  !• Approving/disapproving	  all	  (a)	  requests	  for	  the	  receipt	  of	  weapons	  and	  vehicles	  under	  the	  1033	  Program;	  (b)	  requests	  for	  grant	  funding	  from	  the	  federal	  government	  that	  will	  be	  used	  to	  purchase	  military-­‐style	  weapons	  and	  vehicles;	  and	  (c)	  proposals	  to	  purchase	  military-­‐style	  weapons	  and	  vehicles	  from	  vendors.	  !• Developing	  a	  process	  for	  addressing	  civilian	  complaints	  regarding	  SWAT	  tactics,	  including	  a	  system	  for	  submitting	  complaints,	  conducting	  hearings,	  and	  providing	  for	  individual	  remedies.	  	  !
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• Making	  appropriate	  recommendations	  for	  agency-­‐wide	  reforms.	  	  !• Considering,	  on	  an	  annual	  basis,	  whether	  continued	  maintenance	  of	  a	  SWAT	  team	  is	  appropriate	  and,	  if	  not,	  to	  recommend	  the	  dissolution	  of	  the	  agency’s	  SWAT	  team.	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